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In this paper we test a particular form of interdependent behavior, namely the hypothesis that
individuals' choices of hours of work are influenced by the average hours of work in a social
reference group. There are problems to empirically disentangle the effects of interdependent
behavior and preference variation across groups. We show that panel data or data from several
points in time are needed. In the empirical analysis we combine cross-section data from 1973,
1980 and 1990. Our results support the hypothesis of interdependent behavior. The implication is
that conventional tax policy predictions, in which preference interdependencies are neglected, will
tend to underestimate the effect of a tax reform on hours of work. Our point estimates suggest
that conventional calculations would capture only about a third of the actual change in hours of
work.
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1. INTRODUCTION
In economics we usually assume that individuals only interact via the market. Other social
sciences study direct interactions, both bilateral and in groups. Blomquist (1993) shows that if
there are direct interactions, and we do not account for this, then our predictions of the effect of
changes in the economic environment can be seriously biased. In the present paper we test the
hypothesis of interdependent behavior in an empirical model of labor supply, and we also try to
quantify its importance.
The significance of taking account of interdependent behavior, if it exists, can be illustrated
by a simple example. Suppose the true data generating process is given by hi= const + awi(1-t) +
byi + h h , where hi, wi and yi are hours of work, the wage rate and nonlabor income for individual
i,  h  the arithmetic mean of hours of work and t a proportional tax rate. That is, individual i:s
hours of work are influenced by the average hours of work in the economy. The assumed data
generating process implies that the average hours of work in the economy is given by h = const
+aw (1-t) +b y + h h . The effect of a change in t is given by  ) 1 ( h a t - - = / w d / h d . If we do not
realize that behavior is interdependent, and falsely include  h h  in the constant, we would calculate
the effect as  w /d h d a t - = ; that is, the effect would be underestimated by a proportional factor
) /( h - 1 1.  I f  h  is, say, 0.5 this implies that the effect of a tax change would be underestimated by
50%. Most recent studies of the effect of taxes on labor supply have estimated functional forms
where it is possible that an effect like  h h  is "hidden" in the constant. If there is interdependent
behavior, earlier predictions of the effect of tax reform on labor supply may have been biased.
Several recent studies have attempted to test the hypothesis of interdependent behavior.
Andreoni and Scholz (1990) use American cross-section data to test whether interdependent
preferences can explain patterns of charitable giving. There are quite a few studies in which Dutch
data have been used. Woittiez (1990) estimates models of labor supply for both males and
females. Alessie and Kapteyn (1991) estimate a version of the Almost Ideal Demand System using
a two-year panel. Kapteyn et al. (1997) estimate the linear expenditure system for a cross-section
of households. Woittiez and Kapteyn (1998) study female labor supply. All these studies claim
that their results support the hypothesis of interdependent behavior.2
Most earlier empirical studies of interdependent behavior have used cross-section data, and
the interdependence hypothesis has usually been phrased in terms of individuals being influenced
by the behavior within a set of social reference groups. As we argue in section 2, it might be
difficult to properly identify interdependent behavior using such data. The reason being that it is
difficult to separate preference variation across groups from preference interdependence if only
cross-section data are available. In the context of labor supply, if we use the mean of hours of
work in the reference group as an explanatory variable in the labor supply function, then there is a
risk that we simply catch preference variation across groups. This general conclusion is also in
line with the findings of Manski (1993). Manski actually distinguishes between three effects,
which he denotes endogenous effects, correlated effects and exogenous effects. The first two
effects coincide with what we call interdependent behavior and preference variation. The
exogenous effects imply that the behavior of an individual also varies with the exogenous
characteristics of the reference group to which the individual belongs. We shall argue below that
panel data or repeated cross-section data allow us to identify both interdependent behavior
(endogenous effects) and preference variation across groups (correlated effects), if we make the
identifying assumption that the exogenous effects are absent.
In the present study we use a data source which contains data from 1973, 1980 and 1990.
During this time period the tax schedule changed considerably. In our data we therefore obtain a
variation in average hours of work not only between social reference groups, but also a variation
over time for each reference group. We use the maximum likelihood method to estimate the
parameters of the model. Except for the inclusion of interdependent behavior, the technique is
similar to the one used in Blomquist and Hansson-Brusewitz (1990).
The rest of the study is organized as follows. In section 2 we present the model and the
corresponding likelihood function. We also discuss what kind of data are required in order to test
the hypothesis of interdependent behavior. In section 3 we perform a set of Monte Carlo
simulations. Section 4 describes our data and the empirical results. Section 5 concludes.3
2.   A labor supply model with interdependent behavior
2.1 The model
The Swedish tax system is progressive, with the marginal tax increasing in a stepwise fashion as
taxable income increases. Individuals’ budget sets therefore are piecewise linear with a general
shape as illustrated in figure 1. In this figure H
3 is the upper physical limit an individual can work
and H
0 a lower limit.1 y
1, y
2 and y
3 are the intercepts of the extended linear segments. In the labor
supply literature these intercepts are often denoted ”virtual incomes”. The slopes of the linear
segments can be interpreted as marginal wage rates. The kink points in the interior of the budget
set are denoted by H
1 and H
2. Each segment is defined by the marginal wage rate w
s, virtual
income y
s, lower starting point H
s-1 and upper ending point H
s. As will become clear in section 2.3
below, this characterization of the budget set is quite useful when it comes to solving an
individual’s constrained optimization problem.
Figure 1.  A piecewise linear budget constraint














Let us briefly describe what we will refer to as the standard labor supply model. The vast
majority of recent empirical labor supply studies rely on the implicit assumption that individuals’
preferences are not affected by other individuals’ behavior. That is, changes in wages, income or
taxes are believed to affect hours of work only via the individual’s own budget constraint, wheras
the map of indifference curves remains the same. Assuming that individual i maximizes a strictly
quasi-concave utility function subject to a piecewise linear budget set, the desired hours of work
will be a nonlinear function of the utility function parameters, the tax system and the individuals’
gross wage rate and pretax nonlabor income. Suppressing the dependence on the utility
parameters, we can summarize this as 
*
i h = f(Wi,Yi;t), where 
*
i h  denotes desired hours, Wi is the
                                               
1 In reality, budget sets may consist of a large number of segments. For example, the 1981 Swedish tax and
transfer system generated budget sets consisting of up to 27 segments.4
gross wage rate, Yi pretax nonlabor income and t a vector of tax parameters. (Note that we use
capital letters for pretax economic variables). Finally, taking measurement/optimization errors into
account by adding a normally distributed random term  i e  (i.i.d. and E( i e )=0), observed hours of
work,  i h
~




Beginning in his doctoral thesis [Kapteyn (1977)], Kapteyn has in a series of articles studied
interdependent preferences. He argues that individuals compare themselves to a social reference
group. This idea can be formalized in several ways. In the present study we formulate a model
where individuals’ preferences are affected by the average hours of work in a social reference
group, although the mode or the median might be equally resonable choices to represent the
"social norm".3 We also allow for the possibility that preferences may differ across groups.
Retaining the hypothesis of utility maximization subject to a piecewise linear budget set, our
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j m ),         i=1,...,
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where j indices social reference groups, 
j m  is a group specific preference parameter and 
j N  the
number of individuals in reference group j. 
j h  is the arithmetic mean of observed working hours
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i e ~ N.I.D(0,
2
e s ). The econometric specification used for our empirical application is
described in section 2.3 below.
2.2 Data requirements for identification
The fact that variations in 
j h  can arise because of preference variation across groups implies that
cross-section data can not be used to identify interdependent behavior. To show this we use a
simple linear model where we for simplicity abstract from taxes and exclude nonlabor income.4 In
the following we will also assume that we know to which group each individual belongs. As
Manski (1993) points out, this is a crucial identifying assumption. Let data be generated by
                                               
2 If the sample contains corner observations (at zero hours or at he upper physical limit), then the assumed data
generating process is usually stated in terms of a simple Tobit structure.
3 For simplicity we neglect the possibility that the variance of the hours distribution might be of importance.
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i W  are, respectively, the hours of work and the wage rate of individual i in group
j. In this model there is both interdependent behavior, captured by 
j h h , and a variation in
preferences across groups. The latter is represented by the group specific terms 
j m  in eq. (2). For



































. We denote the expression in
parentheses by 






i W c h
~
e a + + = (4)
Consistent estimation of 
j c  and a is straightforward. However, we cannot from information on
j c  and a deduce the coefficients h and 
j m . Thus, h and 
j m  are not identifiable. This implies that
if data are generated according to (2), then cross-section data can not be used to test the
hypothesis of interdependent behavior.5
Suppose instead that we have panel data, or several cross-sections, and that 
j m  does not
vary over time. We assume that, for some reason, 
j W  varies over time.6 This implies that the




























i W W b c h
~
e a + + + = (6)
Equations (5) and (6) imply the relations
                                               
5 The model that we estimate in this paper is nonlinear in both parameters and variables. (This is because the
budget constraint is nonlinear.) We know that nonlinearities in general help to identify parameters. However,
nonlinearities caused by nonlinear budget constraints do not help to identify m 
j and h if only cross-section data
are used.
6 Applications which study the effect of taxes on labor supply typically have net rather than gross wage rates
entering the supply function. Variations in the mean net wage rate over time can then, for example, occur due to













From (7b) we can solve for h and obtain  ) ( b / b + = a h . We can then solve (7a) and obtain
) ( b / c
j j + = a a m . Thus, if we have panel data or several cross-sections such that within each
group 
j W  varies over time, then h and 
j m  are identifiable.
We have just shown that m 
j and h are identifiable if panel data or several cross-sections are
used. However, in our actual estimation two further problems arise. Firstly, we have cross-section
data from only three points in time. Secondly, given the data available we must use a rather crude
classification of individuals into groups. In section 3 we perform a set of Monte Carlo simulations
to study if one, given these limitations, can identify interdependent behavior.
2.3 The econometric specification
As noted in section 2.1, we assume preferences are strictly convex and that desired hours of work
for each individual are generated by utility maximization subject to a piecewise linear budget set.
To describe the preferences we use the basic supply function as defined in Blomquist & Hansson-
Brusewitz (1990). A basic supply function b(w,y) shows desired hours of work generated by a
linear budget constraint with slope w and intercept y. The budget sets we use in the empirical
analysis and in the Monte Carlo simulations below are convex. Then, given that preferences are
strictly convex, there is a unique solution to the individual’s optimization problem. The basic
supply function can be used in a simple search algorithm to find the desired hours of work (
* h )
implied by the utility optimum.7 Using the notation introduced in connection with figure 1 in
section 2.1, if we calculate b(w
1,y
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1 we move on to the





1 we conclude that the unique optimum is at
the first kink point, H










2 we continue to segment three e.t.c.
We assume preferences are such that, for individual i in group j at time t, the basic supply












jt X y w d b a y + + + =                                       (8)
                                               
7 This algorithm was first described in Hausman (1979).7
where  d is a parameter vector and 
jt
i X  a vector of socio-economic variables representing
observed preference heterogeneity within groups.8 We will estimate a sequence of models that are
special cases of (8):
i.  In the first model, which is the most general, we allow the intercept of the estimated
function, 
jt y , to vary freely both across groups and over time.
ii.  We impose the restriction 
jt j jt h h m y + = . That is, we have a specification with
interdependent behavior as represented by 
jt h h  and group specific preferences as
represented by the terms 
j m . This is the type of model discussed in the preceding
subsection, where we concluded that preference variation across groups can be
distinguished from interdependent behavior if the group effects are time independent.
iii.   We impose the additional restriction 
jt jt h h m y + = . That is, there is interdependent
behavior but no group specific preferences.
iv.   We impose the restriction  m y =
jt . Hence, the fourth specification is a standard labor
supply model which neither contains group specific effects nor interdependent behavior.
These hypotheses are nested, which implies that we may carry out a sequence of likelihood ratio
misspecification tests in order to check the validity of the various models.
Our assumptions are such that the log-likelihood contribution from each group and time
enters the likelihood function additively. It is therefore sufficient to present the likelihood
contribution for one group at time t. The interdependence across observations implied by ii. and
iii. will, in principle, make the likelihood function more complicated than the usual "Hausman"
type likelihood function.9 The likelihood function is derived in some detail in Appendix A. As
explained in the Appendix, we can in practice drop the portion of the likelihood function that
emanates from preference interdependence. In this section we therefore describe a likelihood
function where the interdependence part is excluded.
                                               
8 The corresponding direct utility function was derived in Hausman (1980). We have chosen not to include
unobserved preference variation within groups in our model. The reason for this is that the likelihood function
we present here is a simplified version of a more complicated model described in Appendix A. To include
random preferences in this underlying model would be very difficult. Hence, if data are generated with random
preferences we can regard the likelihood function as a pseudo likelihood function. The fact that we do not allow
for random preferences within groups might lead to a bias in our estimated parameters. To see if this is the case
the Monte Carlo simulations in section 3 are performed for a data generating process where random preferences
are an integral part. We find that this pseudo likelihood function does not lead to biased estimates.
9 Originally developed by Burtless and Hausman (1978), the so called Hausman method takes account of the
complete form of individuals’ budget constraints and uses maximum likelihood techniques to estimate the
parameters of the labor supply function.8
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e s ).10 The likelihood contribution from a typical individual is then given by





* - ( ], with f being the standard normal density function. The log-likelihood
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As our model with interdependent behavior is formulated, it is the population means 
jt h
that should enter the likelihood function. However, due to the fact that we have not been able to
obtain reliable information about the population means, we will instead turn to our data and
calculate the sample means. Since the sample mean is a consistent estimator of the population
mean, the maximum likelihood estimator is still consistent. There is however a possibility that the
estimated asymptotic variances are biased. We investigate this in the Monte Carlo simulations.
3. MONTE CARLO SIMULATIONS
Suppose the true data generating process contains preference variation across social reference
groups and interdependent behavior. What will be the result if we incorrectly estimate a function
that fails to control for interdependent behavior and/or preference variation? What happens if we
are unable to identify the social reference groups properly? The model and likelihood function
developed in the previous section do not allow for unobserved heterogeneity within groups. What
are the properties of the simplified estimation method if data are generated with random
preferences? The estimation method described in the previous section is based on the assumption
that population mean values of the hours of work in each reference group can be measured
without error by using the sample mean values. Is this a harmless assumption or should we expect
                                               
10 This convenient form for the assumed data generating process follows from the fact that our sample does not
include any corner observations at zero hours or at the upper physical limit (see section 4.1 below).9
the estimated asymptotic variances to be seriously biased? In this section we study these issues
with the aid of Monte Carlo simulations.
3.1 Design of experiments
Using the notation of section 2, the data generating process (DGP) is set up as follows: The basic
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i v h + + = h m y . The DGP thus contains preference variation across social reference
groups, interdependent behavior and unobserved preference variation within groups (the random
term 
jt
i v  allows the intercept to vary across individuals). In order to mimic our empirical
application, where we use data from three points in time and classify observations into eight
different groups, we set K=8 and T=3.
The simulations employ a multivariate distribution of gross wage rates and nonlabor income
from actual data. We use a sample of 500 married males with a positive labor supply from the
1981 Level of Living survey.11 Coupled with a slightly stylized version of the Swedish 1980
income tax system, the wage and nonlabor income define a piecewise linear budget constraint for
each individual with at most 19 linear segments. We then use multiples of the sample in order to
generate a population of 80,000 individuals. The population is then split randomly into eight
different social reference groups. We let the groups be of equal size, i.e. N
j= 10,000 for
j=1,…,8.
To obtain variation in 
j h  not only between social reference groups, but also a variation
over time for each reference group, we impose certain changes in the original tax schedule. Then,
when combining the adjusted tax schedules with the wage rate and nonlabor income data, we
generate data for two additional time periods. Data for t=2 are generated by imposing a 50%
reduction of the marginal tax rates in the original tax schedule. Similarly, we obtain data for t=3
by setting all marginal tax rates to zero. The number of individuals in the reference groups are
held constant across time. That is, 
jt N =10,000, j=1,…,8 and t=1,2,3.
                                               
11 The data source is described more closely in section 4.1 below.10
Individuals belonging to the first group (at any point in time) are assigned a constant term
m
1, those belonging to the second group m
2, and so on. The random preference components 
jt
i v
are drawn from a normal distribution with mean zero, variance 
2




i v v )¹0 if and only if
i=s, t=t and j=k. Using the basic supply function we can then, for given values of the preference
parameters, locate each individual's desired hours of work, 
jt
i h
* . The parameter values are given
in table 1. Evaluated at mean values for desired hours, net wage rates and virtual income, these
parameter values imply a mean wage rate elasticity of about 0.1 and an income elasticity of about
-0.1. Finally, by adding a normally distributed measurement error (i.i.d) to the desired hours of
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To estimate the model we generate three cross-sections by random sampling of n
t
observations from the full population 
t N . The generated samples have size n
t=800 for t=1,2,3,
which is the approximate size of the samples we will use in our empirical application. The
experiments are listed in table 2, and will be described in greater detail below.
3.2 Simulation results12
Table 3 displays the results for the interdependence coefficient (h), the wage coefficient (a), the
coefficient for nonlabor income (b) and the intercept of the first reference group (m
1). The results
for each experiment are based on 500 replications, with new samples generated for each
replication. The percentage bias is calculated as 100
. / ˆ ) ( q q - |q |, where q is the true parameter
value and q ˆ  the mean estimate generated by 500 replications. The standard deviation (STD),




2 ) ( k k . ˆ ˆ q q
  MESE denotes the mean of 500 estimated asymptotic standard errors. We
                                               
12 All simulations are performed with programmes written in the Fortran programming language. The GQOPT
package of numerical optimization algorithms (version 6.12) was employed to find the optima for the likelihood
functions. The variance-covariance matrix for the estimated parameter vector is calculated as the inverse of the
Hessian of the log-likelihood function evaluated at the estimated parameter vector.
Table 1. Characteristics of the DGP
t N = 80,000,  t =1,…,3  ; 
jt N = 10,000,  j = 1,…,8 and  t=1,…,3.  
a = 0.01,  b = -0.005,  h = 0.5,
m
1= 1.7, m
2 = 1.5, m
3 = 1.3,…,m
8 = 0.3,
se = 0.1, sv = 0 in simulation 1 and sv = 0.2 in simulations 2, 3, 4 and 5.
Note: The gross wage rate is measured in SEK, nonlabor income in thousands of SEK
and hours of work in thousands of hours.11
also report the ratio MESE/STD, which will be used as a measure of the bias in the variance-
covariance matrix. For example, a ratio below unity suggests that the estimated asymptotic
standard error underestimates, on average, the underlying standard deviation for the parameter.
Finally, we should emphasize that conclusions and remarks made throughout this section are valid
for (at least) the particular samples sizes used in the simulations. However, other sample sizes
could possibly have generated different results.
For simulation 1 data are generated without random preferences. At the estimation stage
we correctly recognize the presence of both interdependent behavior and preference variation
across groups. In addition, we are able to sort observations to the correct reference groups. The
population moments 
jt h  are, however, unobserved in the estimation process. Instead, we let the







n / h ˆ
1 ) 1 ( enter the likelihood function, where n
jt is the number of
observations sampled from group j at time t. The results in table 3 show that we obtain very
accurate estimates of the parameters in the model. All coefficients are virtually unbiased, and for
h, a and m
1 the asymptotic standard errors are, on average, close approximations of the actual
standard deviations for the parameters.13 The latter suggests that sample mean values of hours
worked (
jt h ˆ ) can be substituted for population values (
jt h ) without causing any significant bias
in the estimated variance-covariance matrix.14
Recall that our likelihood function does not account for random preferences. Simulation 2 is
the same as simulation 1 except that data are now generated with random preferences. Table 3
shows that the coefficients are still estimated with a negligible bias. As expected, the sampling
variability increases for all coefficients, but so do the estimated standard errors. However, the
simplified estimation method tends to generate a moderately biased variance-covariance matrix.
For the interdependence coefficient (h) the asymptotic standard error underestimates the
underlying standard deviation by, on average, 10 percent. The nonlabor income coefficient (b) is
                                               
13  Simulations where we used larger samples (not shown in table 3) suggest that the bias in the variance-
covariance matrix for the nonlabor income coefficient (b) is small sample bias that disappears in larger samples.
14 At this point one might ask whether these results carry over to a situation where some reference groups in the
population are quite small in size. The problem is then that relatively few observations would be sampled from
these particular groups. We have performed simulations to study this issue. The basic setup was the same as
described in section 3.1, but for two groups we set the size to 1/50 of the population (rather than 1/8, which was
the case for simulation 1). Consequently, a random sample of 800 observations contained, on average, 16
observations from each of these two groups. The results were quite similar to those reported for simulation 1. The
main effect was a slight increase in the standard deviation for the constant terms corresponding to the two
groups.12
Table 3. Simulation results
Parameter Sim. 1 Sim. 2 Sim. 3 Sim. 4 Sim. 5
h





















MESE/STD 1.00 0.90 0.55 1.63
a








-3   2.85
.10








-4   8.58
.10
-4   2.93
.10
-4   3.09
.10
-4
MESE/STD 1.00 0.82 0.45 1.03 0.79
b
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.10










-4   1.45
.10
-4   1.40
.10
-4
MESE/STD 0.86 0.66 0.32 0.78 0.68
m
1






-2 0.179   1.43
.10








-2 0.101   1.58
.10
-2   1.68
.10
-2
MESE/STD 0.99 0.90 0.56 1.10 0.76
*   Standard deviation of 500 estimates.
** Mean of 500 estimated standard errors.
Table 2. Simulations
DGP Estimation
Sim. sv Estimated function Misclassification
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the most troublesome coefficient; the estimated standard errors underestimate the actual standard
deviation by almost 35 percent. We thus conclude that our simplified estimation method performs
well in the sense that parameter estimates are virtually unbiased. t-values based on the estimated
variance-covariance matrix will however be slightly overstated.15
Simulation 3 is the same as simulation 2 except that we are now unable to identify the social
reference groups properly. We know (for some reason) that there are 8 different groups in the
population, but we have imperfect information on the composition of groups. The mis-
classification of observations is set up as follows: There is a fifty-fifty chance that an individual
who truly belongs to group j is correctly classified as a group j observation. Consequently, 50
percent of the the sampled observations are assigned to an incorrect reference group. The
destination group for a misclassified observation is selected purely at random. Table 3 suggests
that this type of misclassification error might be a potential problem for empirical applications.
The good news is that the coefficients for the net wage rate, nonlabor income and average hours
of work are only moderately biased.16 The coefficient for average hours of work (h) has a
positive bias of approximately 10 percent. However, one might of course suspect this finding to
be heavily influenced by the setup; alternative misclassification schemes could possibly cause more
damage to the results. Simulation 3 also reveals that misclassification errors induce significantly
larger standard deviations for all coefficients. The bad news is that the asymptotic variance-
covariance matrix fails to capture this accurately. For the interdependence coefficient (h), the
asymptotic standard error underestimates the underlying standard deviation by, on average,  45
percent.
Returning to the case of perfect information on the composition of groups, simulation 4
investigates the consequences of estimating a function that fails to control for preference variation
across groups. The coefficients for the net wage rate and nonlabor income are both heavily biased
towards zero. The coefficient for average hours of work is picking up the effects of variations in
                                               
15 We have also considered two alternative ways of including random preferences in the DGP: 1) the wage rate
coefficient (a) varies, and 2) the nonlabor income coefficient (b) varies across individuals. The results were
similar to those reported in table 3.
16 The large negative bias for m
1 is due to the inflow of misclassified observations for which hours of work are, on
average, considerably fewer than for the true group 1 members (recall that group 1 is the group with the largest
value for the constant term). Similarly, m
8 has a large positive bias (not shown), since true members of group 8
are mixed with observations for whom data are generated with larger constant terms.14
preferences across groups. Consequently, if we fail to control for preference variation, then we
run the risk of exaggerating the importance of preference interdependence. 17
What happens if we estimate a function that incorrectly neglects interdependent behavior?
In simulation 5 we recognize that preferences vary across groups, but we do not allow for
interdependent preferences. Hence we may think of it as a conventional labor supply specification.
Omitting the average hours of work variable, the coefficients for the net wage rate and nonlabor
income are both heavily biased away from zero and the constant is picking up some of the effects
of interdependent behavior. Thus, if the DGP is characterized by interdependent behavior and this
is not accounted for in estimation, we encounter two major problems. First, we ignore the special
dynamics that are associated with preference interdependencies. Second, we would expect the
estimated parameters to be seriously biased.
4. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
4.1 Data
We use the Swedish "Level of Living Surveys" from 1974, 1981 and 1991. The surveys describe
the respondents economic conditions in 1973, 1980 and 1990. The 1974 sample consists of 6593
randomly chosen individuals aged 15-75, the 1981 sample of 6813 individuals and the 1991
sample of 6710. The response rate was 85.2% in 1974, 82.4% in 1981 and 79.1% in 1991.
In our sample we only include married men in ages 20-60. Farmers, students, those with
more than four weeks of sick leave, and those who were self-employed are excluded. The
remaining sample consists of 777 observations for 1974, 863 for 1981 and 678 for 1991. For the
three cross-sections combined there are 2318 observations. The data contains detailed information
about taxable income, tax deductions etc. Thus, we are able to model each individual's nonlinear
budget constraint in a detailed and precise way. We believe this kind of data is unique to the
Scandinavian countries. We also take account of housing allowances, which is a quite important
transfer system. The tax and transfer systems create a few minor nonconvexities in individuals’
                                               
17 Suppose the true data generating process contains preference variation across groups but no interdependent
behavior, and we estimate a function that allows for interdependent behavior. Is there a risk that we falsely
conclude that there is interdependent behavior? We have performed simulations to study this issue. The main
results are the following: Controlling for both variations in preferences and, falsely, for interdependent behavior,
we obtain small and insignificant estimates of h. On the other hand, if one does not control for preference
variation, then the results resemble those reported for simulation 4.15
budget sets. To simplify the computations we have convexified the budget sets by taking the
convex hull of a given budget set. Results in Blomquist and Hansson-Brusewitz (1990) and
MaCurdy et al. (1990) suggest that this is a harmless simplification.18
We use annual hours of work in 1973, 1980 and 1990 respectively as the dependent variable
in the labor supply function. This variable is computed from the answers to a series of questions
on average hours/week, and the number of weeks the person worked at full-time and part-time
jobs and moonlighting. Total hours of work are obtained by multiplying the number of working
weeks by hours worked per week for each type of job and then summing over jobs. All individuals
included in our samples had at least some hours of paid employment.19
The gross wage rate is measured by a direct question about the person's wage rate at the
time of the interview. We define nonlabor income on segment 1 of the budget constraint as
Y1=MDI+CAP+BBF, where MDI is the sum of the spouse's total income after tax including child
allowances. We assume MDI affects the hours of work in the same way as exogenous nonlabor
income, i.e. we assume the hours of work of the wife are given and independent of the hours of
work of the man. CAP measures capital income net of the capital income tax, as it would have
been at zero hours of work. It includes imputed income of owner occupied homes. BBF denotes
housing allowances as they would have been at zero hours of work. All economic variables are
adjusted to the 1980 price level. Detailed sample statistics are given in Appendix B.
We formulate the hypothesis of interdependent behavior in such a way that each individual
belongs to a social reference group. The individual is influenced by the average hours of work in
the social reference group to which he belongs. If such groups exist, they would be very difficult
to establish correctly. The proper average would probably be a weighted average. However, given
the data available we must use a rather crude classification of individuals into groups. Previous
studies have usually classified individuals on the basis of observable sociodemographic
                                               
18 See Blomquist (1983) and Blomquist and Hansson-Brusewitz (1990) for details about the tax and transfer
systems in 1973 and 1980, respectively. Table B3 in Appendix B shows the Swedish 1990 national income tax
schedule.
19 For the time period in question the male unemployment rate in Sweden was very low. In the 1973 data set there
was only one man that was unemployed the whole year. For 1990 the corresponding figure was two persons. In
the 1980 sample none was unemployed the whole year. Those persons who were unemployed the whole year were
excluded from the sample. Since only three persons are excluded we do not think this affects our results. Of
course, some individuals were unemployed part of the year. We have not attempted to account for this, but regard
these deviations from desired hours as optimization errors taken care of by the measurement/optimization error.
Very few of the males in the sample had unemployment spells and for those that were unemployed the spells
were usually quite short.16
characteristics. We shall use a classification influenced by the one used in Woittiez (1990) and
Woittiez and Kapteyn (1998).20 We classify people into eight groups according to educational
level, age and the presence of children under 18 years of age in the household. Low education is
defined as education below secondary school. The classification is displayed in table 4.
In the period 1973 to 1990 the tax schedule changed considerably. Thus, if hours of work
are sensitive to variations in economic variables, the change in the tax schedule would induce a
variation in 
j h  over time. In our data we therefore obtain a variation in 
j h  not only between
social reference groups, but also a variation over time for each reference group. As discussed in
section 2.2 above, this should help to identify interdependent behavior. Table B2 in Appendix B
provides some summary statistics for the social reference groups.
4.2 Estimation Results
Let us briefly recapitulate the model we estimate. Using the notation from section 2, observed
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20 Woittiez (1990) and Woittiez and Kapteyn (1998) classify observations according to education and age. Since
Woittiez and Kapteyn have direct survey information on individuals’ social environment, they can do a more
sophisticated grouping. They estimate a latent variables model relating the direct information to the ”true” but
unobserved reference groups.
Table 4. The social reference groups
Group Education Age Children
1 Low £40 Yes
2 High £40 Yes
3 Low £40 No
4 High £40 No
5 Low >40 Yes
6 High >40 Yes
7 Low >40 No
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X is a vector of observable personal attributes with corresponding parameters d. We include in X
the physical age of a person, given by the variable AGE, and the number of children under 18 that
live at home, NC. The population moment 
jt h  is throughout this section estimated by its sample
counterpart. The likelihood function used in the analysis is given by eqs. (9) and (10). We show
the estimated functions in table 5.
Model 1 is the most general as we allow the intercept of the estimated function to vary
freely across both groups and years. In model 2 we impose the restriction that 
jt y  takes the form
mh
jj t h + . That is, we restrict the model in such a way that it allows for group specific
preferences and interdependent behavior. We perform a likelihood ratio test of the restrictions
imposed by model 2. Our null hypothesis is that model 2 (the restricted model) is correct. The
alternative is given by model 1 (the unrestricted model). Let  L
R and  L
U  denote the value of the
likelihood for the restricted and unrestricted models. As test statistic we use -2(lnL
R-ln L
U ),
which has an asymptotic 
2 c  distribution with degrees of freedom given by the number of linear
restrictions imposed by the null hypothesis. The test statistic is in the present case 7.8. The null
hypothesis imposes 24 linear restrictions and implies a critical value for the Chi-square test
statisitic of 36.4 at the 5 % significance level. Hence, the null hypothesis is not rejected.
In model 3 we impose the restriction that there are no group specific preferences (mm
j = ).
Performing a test where we regard model 3 as the null (the restricted model) and model 2 as the
alternative (the unrestricted model), we obtain a test statistic of 2.0. Since the critical value is
15.5, we cannot reject the null hypothesis. Finally, in model 4, we impose the additional
restriction that h = 0, i.e. that there is no interdependent behavior. Model 4 is a traditional type of
labor supply function, which neither incorporates interdependent behavior nor allows for variation
in preferences across social reference groups. Performing a test where model 4 is the null and
model 3 the alternative, we obtain a Chi-square test statisitic of 11.8. There is only one restriction
imposed, so the critical value is 3.84. Hence, the null hypothesis is rejected and model 3 is our
”preferred” model.18
Turning to the parameter estimates for model 3, it should first be noted that the linear basic
supply function requires satisfaction of the Slutsky inequality a-bh³0 in order for preferences to
be convex. The results in table 5 suggest that the Slutsky condition does not represent a binding
constraint for any observation. Hence, data could have been generated by utility maximization
with convex preferences. The coefficient that captures interdependent behavior, h, is significant
and large in the sense that its economic implications are important. We discuss the importance of
this further below. The wage rate and nonlabor income coefficients are significant, and the point
estimates are well in accordance with estimates presented in earlier Swedish studies (see e.g.
Blomquist & Hansson-Brusewitz (1990) and Sacklén (1996)). The impact of socioeconomic
characteristics is insignificant; the coefficients for age and children are small and estimated with
poor precision.
Within the context of our model of interdependent behavior, wage and income elasticities
can be defined in at least two different ways. We define the "partial" wage and income elasticities
in terms of the reaction to a change in the own wage rate or nonlabor income, given that other
individuals’ behavior are unchanged. This is, of course, the way wage and income elasticities are
usually defined. To evaluate the elasticities we merge our three cross-sections and use the mean of
the variables at observed hours of work. Thus, the partial elasticities are formally calculated as
h / w a  and  h / y b , where w  is the mean net wage rate,  y  the mean virtual income and h  the
mean hours of work. For model 3 the implied partial wage and income elasticities are 0.061 and -
0.017, respectively. The income elasticity is about the same as obtained in earlier studies for
Sweden using the standard labor supply model, wheras the wage elasticity is slightly lower.
The partial elasticities might not be very useful if preferences are interdependent. In
particular, the partial elasticities seem irrelevant for the evaluation of tax reform, since changes in
the tax schedule affect almost all individuals’ budget constraints and behavior. Our second type of
wage and income elasticity therefore takes preference interdependencies into account. In table 5
these elasticities are referred to as the "total" wage and income elasticity, respectively. For model
3 we define the total elasticities in terms of the basic labor supply function (12c). Dropping the
group and time superscripts, and averaging, we obtain  X y w h h d b a h m + + + + = . The total
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and similarly for the income elasticity. Evaluating the elasticities at mean sample values for the
variables, the total wage and income elasticities are 0.187 and -0.052, respectively. This implies
that standard tax policy predictions, based on what we refer to as partial elasticities, will tend to
seriously underestimate the effect of a tax reform on hours of work. Comparing the results for
model 3 and model 4 (the standard model), and taking the estimate of h and the implied total
elasticities at face value, we conclude that the standard analysis would capture only about a third
of the actual change in hours of work.
Table 5. Estimation results
Parameter Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4





















































lnL -262.6 -266.5 -267.5 -273.4
LR-statistic - 7.8 2.0 11.8
Partial wage elasticity 0.072 0.063 0.061 0.069
Total wage elasticity - 0.192 0.187 -
Partial income elasticity -0.011 -0.014 -0.017 -0.019
Total income elasticity - -0.043 -0.052 -
Note: Asymptotic t-values are given in parentheses. Hours of work are measured in thousands of hours. The
marginal wage rate is measured in SEK and the virtual income in thousands of SEK, both at the 1980 price
level. Detailed sample statistics are given in Appendix B. The various elasticities are defined and explained in
the text. To conserve on space we do not report the full set of estimated constant terms. For model 1 we show
the constant for group 1 in 1980, and for model 2 (in which the constant varies across groups, but not over
time) the constant for group 1. The full set of estimates is available on request.20
How reliable are the empirical results presented in this section? One reassuring result from
the Monte Carlo experiments in section 3 concerns the identification issue. If data are generated
with interdependent behavior, and this is correctly specified in the estimated function, then our
simulations suggest that the labor supply parameters, including the coefficient for 
jt h , can be
estimated without bias even if data from just three cross-sections are available. On the other hand,
it should also be noted that in estimation we have not accounted for the following three
complications: 1) there might be heterogeneity in preferences within social reference groups, 2)
we use the sample mean of hours of work instead of the population mean, and 3) we do not have
information on individuals’ actual social reference groups. Our Monte Carlo simulations can shed
some light on the extent to which these complications might bias our results.
In the simulations we studied a data generating process like model 2. However, we also
included random preferences in the data generating process. According to simulation 2, the
simplified estimation method (that does not take account of random preferences within groups)
performs well in the sense that parameter estimates remain virtually unbiased. There is, however,
a tendency for the asymptotic standard errors to slightly underestimate the true sampling
variability. Hence, if data are generated with random preferences, we might suspect that the t-
values in table 5 are overstated, but probably not to the extent that it affects the outcome of
conventional significance tests. According to simulation 1, replacing the population variable h
jt
by its sample counterpart appears to be a harmless operation; neither does it seem to bias the
estimated coefficients, nor does it lead to any bias in the asymptotic variances for the
interdependence and wage rate coefficients.
The complication that we feel might be important is the fact that we presumably construct
reference groups in such a way that some individuals are assigned to an incorrect group.
Simulation 3 suggests that misclassification errors will give rise to a positive bias in the estimate
of  h (the parameter corresponding to 
jt h ), i.e. we may exaggerate the importance of
interdependent behavior. The simulation also indicates that the misclassification of individuals
causes significantly larger variances for all coefficients, and that this is not captured by the
asymptotic variance-covariance matrix in an accurate way. Hence, we might suspect that the t-
values in table 5 are upward biased. At the same time, we realize that these findings, to some
extent, can be attributed to the particular setup; alternative misclassification schemes may give rise21
to very different results, which makes it very difficult to assess the effects of misclassification.
However, given the problems to identify social reference groups, we feel that our estimate of the
”interdependence effect” should be interpreted carefully. Nevertheless, we do believe that our
results support the idea that interdepedent behavior is an important economic phenomenon.
5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The predicted effect of tax reform on labor supply can be seriously biased if preferences are
interdependent, but this is neglected when the effect of taxes is calculated. In the present study we
set out to test empirically whether interdependent behavior is an important factor in the
determination of individuals' labor supply. Taking full account of progressive taxation and
income-related transfer programs, we test the hypothesis that individuals' choices of hours of
work are influenced by the average hours of work in a social reference group.
There are several nontrivial estimation problems that have to be dealt with. First, to be able
to identify the impact of interdependent behavior, it is important to control for preference
variation across groups. In the context of the model set out in the paper, neglecting preference
variation across groups means that the estimate of the coefficient for average hours of work may
capture both preference interdependence and preference variation. In section 2.2 we show that it
is not possible to disentangle preference variation across groups from preference interdependence
if only cross-section data from one point in time are available. Instead, we need data such that
there for a given reference group is a variation in average hours of work. Such data can, for
example, be generated if we observe the same group at several points in time, and there are
substantial tax reforms in between. In the present paper we use three Swedish cross-sections
collected between 1974 and 1991, a time period during which the tax schedule changed
considerably.
A second problem concerns the classification of individuals into social reference groups.
Since our data contain no prior information that may help to classify observations into reference
groups, we have to resort to a rather simple classification strategy. We classify observations into
eight groups according to educational level, age and the presence of children under 18 years of
age in the household. Hence, given this crude way of assigning individuals to groups, it seems22
quite likely that some individuals are assigned to an incorrect reference group. We have addressed
this problem by performing a Monte Carlo simulation, where 50 percent of the sampled
observations are assigned to an incorrect reference group. The results suggest that the coefficients
(except for the constant terms) are only moderately biased, wheras standard errors might be
substantially underestimated.
In the empirical analysis we estimate a sequence of nested labor supply models. The first
model, which is the most general, allows the intercept term to vary freely both across groups and
over time. In the second model we impose the restriction that the group effects are time
independent, which makes it possible to distinguish these group effects from interdependent
behavior. In the third model the group specific effects are excluded, while the fourth specification
is a standard labor supply model which neither contains group specific effects nor interdependent
behavior. A sequence of likelihood ratio tests imply (i) we cannot reject the second specification
in favor of the first, which suggests that the group and time effects are interpretable as
representing (time independent) group effects and interdependent behavior, (ii) we cannot reject
that the group specific effects are absent, and (iii) we can reject the fourth specification in favor
of the third, which implies that the model with interdependent behavior is preferred to the
standard labor supply model. In our preferred specification, the coefficient that captures
interdependent behavior turns out highly significant. This implies that conventional tax policy
predictions, in which preference interdependencies are neglected, will tend to underestimate the
effect of a tax reform on hours of work. Accepting the coefficient at face value, the implication is
that conventional calculations would capture only about a third of the actual change in hours of
work.
Several earlier studies have found support for the hypothesis of interdependent behavior.
We believe that our empirical results strengthens the idea that interdependent behavior is an
important economic phenomenon. However, the number of empirical studies is still quite small,
and much research remains to be done in order to increase our understanding of how
interdependent behavior should enter the econometric model. Given that the concept of social
reference groups is valid, it would be particularly useful if future data sources could collect
detailed survey information on individuals’ social environment and reference groups.23
APPENDIX A
The purpose of this appendix is to derive the likelihood function when the complication that arises
due to interdependent behavior is fully accounted for. We will then show that we in practice can
neglect the interdependence term in the likelihood function. To simplify the exposition we ignore
some minor difficulties that are associated with nonlinear taxes. (We take nonlinear taxes into
account in the likelihood function used for actual estimation.) To simplify we also drop the
income effect and the superscripts j and t.
We assume there are N individuals in the social reference group. In the following we think
of this as the population. The data generating process is given by
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This matrix has dimension N´N. Using a result in Mardia et al. (1979) we find that the Jacobian is
|1 - N.a|, or
|J| =  1-h (A5)24
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This likelihod function resembles the likelihood function obtained in the time series framework
with autocorrelated errors (see Amemiya (1985) p. 176). As for that likelihood function we can
define two estimators. One is defined as the estimates that maximize lnL and the other as the
estimates that maximize  L ln~ .  For small  N  the two estimators will differ. Within the time series
framework Beach and MacKinnon (1978) show that for small values of N  it can be important to
include the Jacobian term. However, the asymptotic properties of the two estimators are the
same.  We do not know the exact size of N  in our application, but for the social reference groups
we use  N  are in the order of magnitude of 50,000 or more. Hence, in our estimations we have
dropped the ”interdependence” term ln1-h . However, we want to emphasize that for small
values of  N  it might be important to include the ”interdependence” term.
There is one further complication. We can not observe the population but only a random

























where the population mean h  is replaced by the sample mean  ￿ h .  Since the sample mean is a
consistent estimator of the population mean this should still yield consistent estimates. The fact
that we use an estimate of the population mean might, however, lead to a bias in our estimate of
the variance-covariance matrix. The sampe size we use is fairly large so this might not be a
problem in practice. We investigate this in our Monte Carlo simulations.25
APPENDIX B
Table B1. Summary statistics: sample means and standard deviations
1973 1980 1990
Variable Mean St.dev. Mean St.dev. Mean St.dev. Unit
Hours of work 2.135 0.263 2.091 0.244 2.120 0.327 1000’s of hours
Gross wage rate 40.2 14.9 40.8 14.1 45.2 16.1 SEK
CAP -6.998 9.318 -10.345 16.672 -17.141 17.660 1000’s of SEK
BBF 6.978 7.736 4.663 4.121 1.525 2.409 1000’s of SEK
MDI 23.889 17.040 42.089 24.049 39.012 13.575 1000’s of SEK
NC 1.30 1.07 1.21 1.06 1.43 1.10 No. of children
AGE 42.0 10.2 39.8 10.5 43.4 8.9 Years
No. of
observations 777 863 678 Observations
Note: All economic variables are adjusted to the 1980 price level (CPI73=1.988, CPI90=0.482). The exchange
rate SEK/$(U.S.) was, on average, 4.37 in 1973, 4.23 in 1980 and 5.92 in 1990.




w h % of
sample
w h % of
sample
w h
1 33.6 15.1 2.130 29.9 14.3 2.089 19.5 17.7 2.074
2 7.7 18.2 2.115 12.3 16.6 2.140 12.7 19.9 2.130
3 3.6 14.3 2.129 9.2 14.3 2.083 2.7 18.1 2.161
4 2.0 17.6 2.157 4.1 14.2 2.066 1.6 18.1 2.315
5 25.7 15.6 2.153 20.0 14.1 2.090 27.6 18.5 2.122
6 4.1 22.3 2.137 5.4 15.7 2.134 14.7 21.8 2.152
7 21.0 15.0 2.112 16.8 13.9 2.088 18.1 19.1 2.108
8 2.3 21.9 2.210 2.3 16.3 2.154 3.1 23.2 2.133
Note: The mean net wage rate,  w , is measured in SEK and hours of work, h , in thousands of hours. Net
wage rates are adjusted to the 1980 price level (CPI73=1.988, CPI90=0.482). We calculate net wage
rates by linearizing individuals’ budget sets around observed hours of work.
Table B3. The 1990 national tax system
Basic tax Added tax
Taxable income (SEK) Marginal tax rate Tax base (SEK) Marginal tax rate
                  -75,000 0.03                  -140,000 0
       75,000- 0.17     140,000-190,000 0.14
    190,000- 0.25
Note: The tax bases differed for the basic and the added tax, because certain deductions were not allowed when
paying the added tax.26
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